



**WORKING CONDITIONS IN
THE PLATFORM ECONOMY**

Fairwork Jordan Ratings 2023



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Executive Summary

This first Fairwork report on Jordan’s platform economy sheds light on the need for worker-friendly regulatory mechanisms. Regulation needs to ensure that international and national standards of decent work, particularly regarding minimum wage, working hours and access to social protection also consistently apply in the platform economy.

This report finds evidence of deviation from these standards. Other practices on some platforms emerged as specific to Jordan- such as introducing a system that requires workers to pay their commission before earning income from their work, further challenge the principles of fair and decent work in the sector. This report also explores the effect of platform work on mental health and finds that many platform workers feel unsafe at work. Finally, the report highlights the need for adequate sector regulation given platform workers are currently left outside of the social protection system and the protections of Jordanian labour law.

This report evaluates eight platforms operating in Jordan as ride-hailing (five platforms) or delivery applications (three platforms) against the five “Fairwork principles” of fair pay, fair conditions, fair contracts, fair management, and fair representation. These principles act as standards for assessing how well the platforms are doing in terms of safeguarding workers’ rights. This year, the platforms Careem, Careem Box, Jeeny, Talabat, Taxi F, Queen Car, Uber, and Zad were rated. None of the platforms was able to score a single point in this year’s rating. This absence of scores highlights the precarity of workers in Jordan’s platform economy, which results from regulatory gaps following the fast pace of the platform economy’s growth in Jordan.

The Fairwork rating process starts by conducting initial research to identify and assess platforms, collect pertinent documents, and initiate communication with platform management. Interviews are also carried out with platform workers to understand their job procedures, verify platform

policies, and collect their viewpoints. The Fairwork scoring mechanism allocates points to platforms based on evidence that they fulfil distinct benchmarks for each principle. Unfortunately, although all eight platforms were invited to stakeholder meetings in May 2023, none of the platform representatives accepted our invitation.

The study reveals shortcomings across all dimensions of fair work practices. Platform workers operate as freelancers and therefore working hours and income differs between workers. However, for workers that worked eight and more hours a day, no platform policies or mechanisms were found to be in place to assure those workers a minimum wage, resulting in financial strain and psychological stress for workers. Timely payment was problematic for many, impacting net earnings due to extended working hours and increased costs. Moreover, safety measures provided during the pandemic were short-lived, with interviewed workers stating that they eventually had to cover some of the costs themselves. Workers encountered challenges related to their mental health and overall well-being due to factors such as robberies, and verbal and physical abuse from customers.

Regarding fair contract conditions, platforms provided intricate and often unclear and difficult legal documents to workers, occasionally only available in English, which makes them less accessible to workers. As a result, the workers we spoke to were often unaware of the Terms and Conditions and any subsequent changes in work contracts. Workers we spoke to outlined that communication between them and platform managers did not always have an efficient formal channel. The absence of formal labour collective

mechanisms was evident from interviews, and platform workers had to depend on informal associations and social media for collective agency. Female workers reported to us instances of discrimination and harassment.

Overall, this assessment underscores the immediate need for enhancements in fair pay, fair conditions, fair contracts, fair management and fair representation within these platforms in Jordan.

We hope this report will serve as a valuable resource for workers and platforms alike in jointly working to improve working conditions in this growing sector of the Jordanian economy. Ultimately, the insights gained from this report can provide regulators with a fundamental understanding of the dynamics of platform labour and the specifics of workers' experiences. With this understanding, we hope that regulators, such as the Ministry of Labour, Ministry of Digital Economy and Entrepreneurship and the Land Transport Regulatory Authority (LTRC), will collaborate with other stakeholders including platform managements and platform worker representatives to devise reforms that prioritise workers in the platform economy, resulting in a clear improvement in working conditions.

Fairwork Jordan Team


This report has been developed by the Phenix Center for Economic and Informatics Studies, in collaboration with Fairwork. The research team consisted of Ahmad Awad, Anna Sting, Marah Abbas, Vivien Kuehnen, Murali Shanmugavelan, Morad Kotkot, and Mark Graham.

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The authors would like to extend special thanks to all the workers who dedicated their time and efforts to share their experiences with us during the worker interviews. Without their insights, this report would not have been possible.

PLATFORM WORKERS OPERATE AS FREELANCERS AND THEREFORE WORKING HOURS AND INCOME DIFFERS BETWEEN WORKERS. HOWEVER, FOR WORKERS THAT WORKED EIGHT AND MORE HOURS A DAY, NO PLATFORM POLICIES OR MECHANISMS WERE FOUND TO BE IN PLACE TO ASSURE THOSE WORKERS A MINIMUM-WAGE LEVEL INCOME, RESULTING IN FINANCIAL STRAIN AND PSYCHOLOGICAL STRESS FOR WORKERS.

Key Findings



FAIR PAY

Platform workers in Jordan legally operate as freelancers; thus, working hours and consequent income varied between workers. For those workers who continuously worked 48 hours/week, we found no evidence that platforms had mechanisms or policies in place that aim to guarantee those workers the legal full-time (48hrs/week) monthly minimum wage of 260 Jordanian Dinars (USD 367) per month.

Workers we spoke to experienced problems receiving timely pay, resulting in financial and psychological stress for platform workers. Long working hours and increased costs often meant lower net earnings. Further, there was no evidence of platform policies or mechanisms that aimed to define and guarantee an estimated living wage for workers who consistently worked full-time at 48 hours a week.



FAIR CONDITIONS

While platforms we evaluated provided their workers with Personal Protective Equipment, sanitisers, and other essential safety during the pandemic, these protective measures were shortlived, and workers eventually had to pay for some of this protective equipment themselves.

Workers' mental health and general well-being issues is an important issue for this sector. Robbery, fear of kidnapping, and verbal and physical abuse from customers affected the physical and mental well-being of many of the workers we spoke to. Some platforms compromised workers' safety by incentivising them to complete their jobs faster, even if this put workers at risk.



FAIR CONTRACTS

There needed to be more evidence for any platform to secure a point under Fair Contracts. Our legal review found that contracts were long, made inaccessible with legal jargon, and were sometimes only made available in English.

Terms and Conditions were not readily accessible by workers, and some workers reported that platforms hardly notified them of changes in Terms and Conditions. Moreover, platforms were not transparent enough about their pricing and job allocation policies.



FAIR MANAGEMENT

All eight platforms offered some form of communication channel to contact them when workers were in need. However the workers we spoke to from all eight platforms reported a lack of documented process or consistent and efficient mechanism to engage with platform managers.

Some of the female workers we spoke to felt they had experienced discrimination, including verbal harassment and abuse by platform managers and customers. We could not identify any platform that met the criteria to be awarded points for this principle.



FAIR REPRESENTATION

We could not award a point to any platform under this principle, given that no platform had a formal labour collective mechanism to share workers' concerns with the management.

In the absence of a government-recognised union for the sector, freedom of association of platform workers in Jordan largely depends on informal associations and social media platforms. No platform was able to show that they have a documented mechanism or process to engage with these workers or their representatives. Platform workers have therefore consolidated their concerns and demands outside of any formal collective association.

The Jordanian Platform Economy

The platform economy in Jordan has grown rapidly over the last decade, especially when it comes to ride-hailing and delivery services. There are several reasons for this growth. One is that the overall economic situation in the country that has seen high rates of population growth due to domestic demographic factors as well as refugee and migration movements from neighbouring countries. Unfortunately, Jordan's economy has been seeing stagnant economic growth of about 2–2.5 percent for the last ten years,¹ which is simply not enough to generate enough jobs for everyone. Unemployment rates are high, and economic participation rates are low—especially among women and youth, where unemployment rates have reached approximately 30 percent and 50 percent respectively.² At the same time, as is the case for many countries, the cost of living is rising and people in Jordan are struggling to make ends meet. Jordan's poverty rate has now reached a historic level of 24.1 percent.³ All of these challenges are highly gendered and impact vulnerable groups disproportionately.

It is a natural consequence in these circumstances that people of working age will resort to other, non-traditional avenues to generate an income to support themselves and their families. The platform economy, offers this opportunity. In a country that has leapfrogged into becoming ever more digitally adept—90 percent of phone users own a smart phone⁴—the expansion of the platform

economy has the potential to foster economic opportunity and job growth in Jordan.

One of the reasons why ride-hailing platforms have been able to thrive in Jordan is the fragmented public transport system, which has not been able to keep up with the rapid population growth and urban expansion of the capital city of

Amman. Even though commendable efforts such as the Bus Rapid Transport System have been introduced, commuting in the city mainly takes place by car and even those not owning a car rely on traditional taxis or ride-hailing apps. Ride-hailing apps therefore meet a real need for Jordanians trying to move between point A and B. Particularly for women—who fear harassment on public transport—ride-hailing services provide an avenue to participate both in the labour market and in society.

Turning to other forms of platform work, an estimated 25,000 individuals in Jordan currently work in food delivery. While not all of those workers are platform workers (some are employed directly by restaurants), this number highlights the popularity of (food) delivery apps in Jordan.⁵ The reasons for the popularity of food delivery apps have not been thoroughly studied, however, the manager of one food delivery platform has been quoted as saying that the food delivery business had grown significantly as a result of strict lockdowns that were instated during the Covid-19 pandemic. During that time, many restaurants that were initially hesitant to connect with food delivery

platforms realised the potential of offering food delivery.⁶ From a customer perspective, the convenience offered by food delivery remains attractive even after the lifting of restrictions. Finally, the popularity of goods delivery stems partly from a postal system that is not always perceived as efficient and fast enough⁷—many international private delivery companies operate in Jordan, supplemented by platform delivery services.

While the platform economy in Jordan has the potential to offer relief from some of Jordan’s economic and infrastructural challenges, it has yet to offer its workers decent working conditions, such as access to social security and the protection offered by Jordan’s labour law: they operate as freelancers that fall outside the scope of those provisions. These challenges are outlined in this report. We hope that the report contributes to a broader discussion amongst all relevant stakeholders on the regulations and policies governing this sector to include platform workers in labour law provisions and social protection systems.



Towards Decent Labour Standards in the Platform Economy

Fairwork evaluates and ranks the working conditions of digital platforms. Our ratings are based on five principles that digital labour platforms should ensure in order to be considered to be offering basic minimum standards of fairness.

We evaluate platforms annually against these principles to show not only what the platform economy is today, but also what it could be. The Fairwork ratings provide an independent perspective on labour conditions of platform work for policymakers, platform companies, workers, and consumers. Our goal is to show that better, and fairer, jobs are possible in the platform economy.

The Fairwork project is coordinated from the Oxford Internet Institute and the WZB Berlin Social Science Center. Our growing network of researchers currently rates platforms in 38 countries across 5 continents. In every country, Fairwork collaborates closely with workers, platforms, advocates and policymakers to promote a fairer future of platform work.

Fairwork countries




Figure 1. Fairwork currently rates platforms in 38 countries worldwide.

AFRICA

Egypt, Ghana, Kenya, Morocco, Nigeria, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda

ASIA

Bangladesh, India, Indonesia, Jordan, Lebanon, Pakistan, Philippines, Singapore, Vietnam

EUROPE

Albania, Austria, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, France, Georgia, Germany, Italy, Serbia, Spain, UK

SOUTH AMERICA

Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay

NORTH AMERICA

Mexico, US

The Fairwork Framework

Fairwork evaluates the working conditions of digital labour platforms and ranks them on how well they do. Ultimately, our goal is to show that better, and fairer, jobs are possible in the platform economy.

The five Fairwork principles were developed through multiple multi-stakeholder workshops at the International Labour Organisation. To ensure that these global principles were applicable in the context of Jordan, we have subsequently revised and fine-tuned them in consultation with platform workers, platforms, trade unions, regulators, academics, and labour lawyers. Further details on the thresholds for each principle, and the criteria used to assess the collected evidence to score platforms can be found in the Appendix.




STEP 1

The five principles



Fair Pay

Workers, irrespective of their employment classification, should earn a decent income in their home jurisdiction after taking account of work-related costs. We assess earnings according to the mandated minimum wage in the home jurisdiction, as well as the current living wage.



Fair Conditions

Platforms should have policies in place to protect workers from foundational risks arising from the processes of work, and should take proactive measures to protect and promote the health and safety of workers.



Fair Contracts

Terms and conditions should be accessible, readable and comprehensible. The party contracting with the worker must be subject to local law and must be identified in the contract. Regardless of the workers' employment status, the contract is free of clauses which unreasonably exclude liability on the part of the service user and/or the platform.



Fair Management

There should be a documented process through which workers can be heard, can appeal decisions affecting them, and be informed of the reasons behind those decisions. There must be a clear channel of communication to workers involving the ability to appeal management decisions or deactivation. The use of algorithms is transparent and results in equitable outcomes for workers. There should be an identifiable and documented policy that ensures equity in the way workers are managed on a platform (for example, in the hiring, disciplining, or firing of workers).



Fair Representation

Platforms should provide a documented process through which worker voice can be expressed. Irrespective of their employment classification, workers should have the right to organise in collective bodies, and platforms should be prepared to cooperate and negotiate with them.



STEP 2

Methodology Overview

The Fairwork project uses three approaches to effectively measure fairness of working conditions at digital labour platforms: desk research, worker interviews and surveys, and interviews with platform management. Through these three methods, we seek evidence on whether platforms act in accordance with the five Fairwork Principles.

We recognise that not all platforms use a business model that allows them to impose certain contractual terms on service users and/or workers in such a way that meets the thresholds of the Fairwork principles. However, all platforms have the ability to influence the way in which users interact on the platform. Therefore, for platforms that do not set the terms on which workers are retained by service users, we look at a number of other factors including published policies and/or procedures, public statements, and website/app functionality to establish whether the platform has taken appropriate steps to ensure they meet the criteria for a point to be awarded against the relevant principle.

In the case of a location-based work platform, we seek evidence of compliance with our Fairwork principles for location-based or “gig work” platforms, and in the case of a cloudwork platform, with our Fairwork principles for cloudwork platforms.

Desk research

Each annual Fairwork ratings cycle starts with desk research to map the range of platforms to be scored, identify points of contact with management, develop suitable interview guides and survey instruments, and design recruitment strategies to access workers. For each platform, we also gather and analyse a wide range of documents including contracts, terms and conditions, published policies and procedures, as well as digital interfaces and website/app functionality. Desk research also flags up any publicly available information that could assist us in scoring different platforms, for instance the provision of particular services to workers, or the existence of past or ongoing disputes.

The desk research is also used to identify points of contact or ways to access workers. Once the list of platforms has been finalised, each platform is contacted to alert them about their inclusion in the annual ranking study and to provide them with information about the process. All platforms are asked to assist with evidence collection as well as with contacting workers for interviews.

Platform interviews

The second method involves approaching platforms for evidence. Platform managers are invited to participate in semi-structured interviews as well as to submit evidence for each of the Fairwork principles. This provides insights into the operation and business model of the platform, while also opening up a dialogue through which the platform could agree to implement changes based on the principles. In cases where platform managers do not agree to interviews, we limit our scoring to evidence obtained through desk research and worker interviews.

Worker interviews

The third method is interviewing platform workers directly. A sample of 6–10 workers are interviewed for each platform. These interviews do not aim to build a representative sample. They instead seek to understand the processes of work and the ways it is carried out and managed. These interviews enable the Fairwork researchers to see copies of the contracts issued to workers, and learn about platform policies that pertain to workers. The interviews also allow the team to confirm or refute that policies or practices are really in place on the platform.

Workers are approached using a range of different channels. For our 2023 ratings, this included, in addition to our tried and tested participant recruitment methods, Facebook and LinkedIn advertisements and snowballing from interviews conducted in an earlier phase. In all these strategies informed consent was established, with interviews conducted both in person and online.

The interviews were semi-structured and made use of a series of questions relating to the 10 Fairwork (sub)principles. In order to qualify for the interviews, workers had to be over the age of 18 and have worked with the platform for more than two months.

Putting it all together

This threefold approach provides a way to cross-check the claims made by platforms, while also providing the opportunity to collect both positive and negative evidence from multiple sources. Final scores are collectively decided by the Fairwork team based on all three forms of evidence. Points are only awarded if clear evidence exists on each threshold.

How we score

Each of the five Fairwork principles is broken down into two points: a first point and a more second point that can only be awarded if the basic point has been fulfilled. Every platform receives a score out of 10. Platforms are only given a point when they can satisfactorily demonstrate their implementation of the principles. Failing to achieve a point does not necessarily mean that a platform does not comply with the principle in question. It simply means that we are not—for whatever reason—able to evidence its compliance.

The scoring involves a series of stages. First, the in-country team collates the evidence and assigns preliminary scores. The collated evidence is then sent to external reviewers for independent scoring. These reviewers are both members of the Fairwork teams in other countries, as well as members of the central Fairwork team. Once the external reviewers have assigned their scoring, all reviewers meet to discuss the scores and decide final scoring. These scores, as well as the justification for them being awarded or not, are then passed to the platforms for review. Platforms are then given the opportunity to submit further evidence to earn points that they were initially not awarded. These scores then form the final annual scoring that is published in the annual country Fairwork reports.

FURTHER DETAILS ON THE FAIRWORK SCORING SYSTEM ARE IN THE APPENDIX.



BACKGROUND

Jordan's Socio-economic Conditions, Labour Market Challenges and the Platform Economy

Jordan's economy, one of the smallest in the Middle East, faces many challenges, including stagnant economic growth, high unemployment, and underemployment.⁸ The economy's ability to generate sufficient jobs is constrained by various factors, including the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic, demographic challenges like high birth rates and an influx of refugees from neighbouring countries, and cultural hurdles, in particular concerning the economic participation of women. Overall economic participation rates are low (33.3 percent), but are especially low among women (13.7 percent),⁹ while unemployment rates are notably high. As of the first quarter of 2023, the Jordanian Department of Statistics recorded the unemployment rate in Jordan at 21.9 percent.¹⁰ Unemployment rates are higher for women, with 30.7 percent of women being unemployed, compared to 19.6 percent of men.¹¹

Limited opportunities in the formal labour market and other barriers push people to seek employment in the informal economy. Currently, Jordan's official employment statistics do not include workers in the informal sector (which includes platform workers), leaving them out of existing state-supported social security schemes. A recent assessment of the size of the informal economy based on an evaluation of Social Security Corporation and ILO data estimates that 51.6 percent of Jordan's economy is informal,¹² with the World Bank estimating the size of the informal sector at 59 percent.¹³ In 2023, a policy paper by the Jordan Strategy Forum calculated that the percentage of informal employment to total employment stands at 46.1 percent, close to the ILO's estimate of 51.6 percent¹⁴. A 2019 study for USAID came to a similar result, stating that 46 percent of the workforce are informal workers, contributing to around 25 percent of the GDP in Jordan.¹⁵ Combined, this brings about many challenges—including from a macroeconomic perspective, as 25 percent of Jordan's GDP remains untaxed—in addition to half of the workforce being excluded from the protection of the social security system and labour laws.

Of those entitled to social security (estimated between 50–53 percent¹⁶) in Jordan, 55.4 percent earn below 500 JOD per month (706 USD),¹⁷ 45.8 percent earn below 400 JOD, 40.6 percent earn below 300 JOD, and 29.4 percent

earn below 250 JOD.¹⁸ The national minimum wage is set at 260 JOD (367 USD) per month.¹⁹ This, however, is barely enough to cover living costs, particularly in the capital of Amman, where 42 percent of Jordan's population lives,²⁰ or 4.7 million people.²¹ While there are no official numbers on the amount needed to cover living costs in Jordan, different sources suggest that it ranges between 480 and 502 JOD (USD 680-708) per month to cover a mean family's costs.²² In the context of the government's decision not to raise the minimum wage, one economic expert even claimed earlier this year that "The minimum wage must be at least doubled to be suitable for workers and suitable for the economic conditions in Jordan."²³

As a result of these conditions, our research suggests that workers increasingly resort to informal opportunities elsewhere to generate or supplement their income. Platforms, often operating as part of the informal economy, have thus become an opportunity for many to either bridge periods of unemployment or to generate additional income. This work can be categorised into two forms of employment: First, "geographically tethered" or location-based platform work, which requires work to be done in a particular location, as is the case for delivery drivers, ride-hailing, or those using platforms to work in domestic or care work. Secondly, "cloud work" or online work, which can be performed from anywhere using the internet, such as online



freelancing. Both models have in common that while the platforms facilitate workers to find work, working conditions are generally precarious, platform companies receive a high share of the service payment, and contracts are constructed mainly to exclude workers from social protection schemes. This report focuses on geographically tethered work in Jordan, in particular on ride-hailing and delivery platforms.

According to media reports citing statements from the Land Transport Regulatory Commission (LTRC), more than 28 unlicensed and seven licensed ride-hailing platforms currently operate in Jordan.²⁴ These platforms create jobs, contribute to the ease of movement for Jordanians and have the potential to enhance economic participation. A 2022 report for the World Bank estimates Jordan's transport-related inefficiencies to cost about US\$3 billion annually, or at least 6 percent of GDP—not including the impact on women's labour force participation.²⁵ With a growing population, mainly concentrated in Amman, the demand for mobility is growing. Under its Economic Modernisation Vision, the Jordanian government is seeking to address this demand by including measures to improve public transport.²⁶ Operational and institutional fragmentation and low investment in infrastructure for pedestrians, cyclists, and public transport have left Jordan's public transport system uncoordinated and inefficient.²⁷ The lack of reliable transportation primarily affects women and youth. Less than 50 percent of women use public transport in Jordan; without private cars, including taxis and ride-hailing apps, many women face difficulties in reaching their work due to their or their families' fear of harassment.²⁸ The lack of safe transportation is often cited as one of the main reasons for the high female unemployment and low economic participation rates.²⁹ Women's low labour market participation is estimated to result in an economic loss of around US\$65 million yearly by 2030.³⁰ The lack of efficient and affordable public transport services also affects Jordan's youth, with 78 percent of Jordan's graduates stating that the unavailability of transport poses an obstacle to accessing work.³¹

While platform work might offer employment opportunities this is in practice nearly exclusive to males, given that ride-hailing platforms are considered to be socially and culturally inappropriate employment opportunities for women. In the context of our research, the team managed to contact two female drivers working on a ride-hailing platform. However, one reported that she had stopped working on the platform, and the other refused to be

interviewed, confirming the gender-based social stigma. Our research suggests that more women seem to find employment in delivery platforms, even though the sector is still male-dominated. For one of the delivery platforms we evaluated, the majority of workers who we are able to interview were women, who stated that a considerable number of women worked on the platform. In general, working on delivery platforms is more financially accessible for workers than working on ride-hailing apps, as policies with regards to the age of vehicles³² do not apply to workers who are not transporting passengers, meaning that workers do not have to invest in new cars to conduct their work.

Legal and regulatory context of ride-hailing platforms in Jordan

Current license permit regulations support Uber and Careem's market domination

When ride-hailing platforms first started operating in Jordan in 2015, platform workers and platforms required no license to work in the sector. The traditional “yellow taxi” drivers were disadvantaged compared with platform workers, as the latter did not have to bear the costs of licensing expenses and procedures. This came to an end in 2017/18 when a license permit for platform workers became mandatory. Regulators allocated a maximum number of licenses to platform workers, and made it mandatory that yellow taxi drivers could offer these services on the ride-hailing platforms as well. Since then, customers have been able to choose between a platform worker or a yellow taxi driver on ride-hailing platforms. In order to not disadvantage yellow taxi drivers, yellow taxi drivers were allowed to use ride-hailing platforms with a reduced commission fee.

Ride-hailing platform workers must pay 400 JOD annually to obtain a ride-hailing permit at the Land Transportation Regulatory Commission (LTRC), allowing them to work for the so-called premium ride-hailing companies Careem and Uber. This payment is compulsory for all ride-hailing workers in Jordan. If workers want to work for other non-premium platforms they must pay an additional 20 JOD per year per additional platform, while they are still required to acquire the Uber/Careem license at the expense of 400 JOD. Effectively, all workers working on licensed ride-hailing platforms must carry a license to work for Uber and Careem—encouraging their market domination over other platforms. When requesting their initial permit, workers can only choose between Uber and Careem.

Despite granting this market domination through licenses, the LTRC caps the maximum number of workers allowed to work on Uber and Careem, controlling the scale of Uber and Careem's operations. The license regulations also indirectly control the scale of non-premium licensed ride-hailing platforms in Jordan. Those who wish to work as drivers but who are unable to obtain a license (or are unable to pay for it), are thereby pushed to work with platforms that are not licensed by the LTRC. The regulations, therefore, have the side effect of encouraging unofficial and unlicensed platforms.

According to our research, seven ride-hailing platforms have been able to secure agreements with the LTRC to operate in Jordan; however, only four of them are currently operating (Uber, Careem, Jeeny, and Petra Ride), and three are financially insolvent. Approximately 28 platforms operate without a license.³³ Of these, we assess Taxi-F and Queen Car in this report. While these companies charge commission fees, they do not pay the sales tax of 4 percent which is applied to licensed platforms, thus offering customers cheaper fares. The lack of a permit fee makes the unlicensed platforms financially attractive to workers because they do not have to pay the annual license fee of 400 JOD, equivalent to almost two months of the minimum wage.

Triple taxation of workers

Licensed ride-hailing workers in Jordan face the financial burden of what can be classified as triple taxation—having to pay annual platform license fees, sales tax, driver's license renewal fees and car insurance. Firstly, workers must pay 400 JOD a year for their ride-hailing permit for the premium platforms Uber and Careem, plus 20 JOD annually for non-premium platforms Jeeny and Petra Ride. The annual permit fee is mandatory for

people to operate legally as ride-hailing workers. Secondly, all licensed workers must pay a 4 percent sales tax for ride services. This sales tax on services and goods implies that the drivers are the ones selling their services, not platforms, and is added to the commission fee that the company charges the driver per trip. Thirdly, all drivers in Jordan must pay annual vehicle licenses and car ownership insurance. According to the drivers we interviewed for this report, the amount varies depending on the car type, 34 averaging at around 100 JOD per year.

The “triple tax burden” on workers represents a noticeable deduction from their income. As a result of this, unlicensed platforms—which bypass annual permit fees and sales taxes—become more attractive to workers. While all ride-hailing drivers are considered freelancers and are already excluded from social protection schemes, the informal and thus illegal nature of unlicensed platforms puts workers into even more precarious working conditions, as they face fines and police investigation, and have less recourse to approach officials for support than those working for licensed platforms. The illegal nature also implies a lack of customer protection.

Paying commission in advance: Balance cards

In Jordan, most platforms offer customers the possibility to pay in cash, including for ride-hailing apps. At the end of the ride, the platform application interface will show customer and driver the amount that needs to be paid. In this case, the platform cannot seem to automatically deduct its commission as is the case with card payments. A problematic practice we observed in Jordan involves certain platforms requiring workers to pay their trip commission for cash-paid trips upfront. At least two platforms, Jeeny and Queen Car, use this prepayment approach, which is referred to locally as having to purchase a “balance card.” In the case of Jeeny, according to our worker interviews, these balance cards are exclusively available for purchase at TotalEnergies petrol stations. TotalEnergies petrol stations offer a 5 JOD balance card for 5.80 JODs, marking a price increase of 16 percent. Jeeny deducts the commission for each trip from the balance card at the end of each cash-paid trip, similar to a pre-paid phone card.

This balance card system places an avoidable financial strain on the workers for these platforms. This compels

workers to undertake enough trips to balance out their commission against their earnings. Importantly, once the credit on the card is depleted, workers cannot accept new cash-paid assignments, but are only assigned trips that will be paid by credit card, where commission deductions take place automatically. The vast majority of drivers we interviewed preferred cash payments due to delays in credit-card payment processes, pushing them to acquire another balance card. While the amount of the balance card payments might seem low compared to the driver’s earnings, this system can significantly impact drivers’ economic situation.

Workers on Queen Car can also purchase balance cards for their work on the “Dinarak” platform. However, the workers we interviewed for this report reported differing commissions for the Dinarak intermediary—from 0.25 to 0.60 piasters (thus an up-charge of 6 to 12 percent) to purchase a 5 JOD balance card.

Platform workers fall outside of social protection

The lack of social security and health insurance remains another hurdle for platform workers in Jordan. Due to workers’ independent contractor status, the government does not include platform workers in the social protection scheme. Workers can, however, register voluntarily for social security if they pay 17.5 percent of their wages to Jordan’s Social Security Cooperation (SSC).³⁴ In 2023, 93,000 individuals voluntarily registered, making up 6.2 percent of the total insured population.³⁵ However, according to a 2022 study, only two per cent of Careem’s workers have voluntarily registered with the SSC.³⁶ In our own study, we identified two significant challenges to platform workers taking part in the SSC, stemming from the nature of platform work and its relatively low wages. Firstly, platform workers experience irregular earnings, leading to fluctuations in their potential contributions to the SSC. This variability in income makes it challenging to determine a consistent contribution level. Secondly, the wage amount remaining after voluntary contributions, considering the unpredictable nature of platform earnings, adds another layer of complexity to estimating available financial resources for drivers. Thirdly, this contribution is proportionally large. In a hypothetical case, where a worker earns an income of 500 JOD a month, a contribution of 17.5 percent translates to 87.50 JOD. Assuming housing rent costs are 250 JOD (as many of the workers we spoke

to indicated), this means more than a third (35 percent) of their rent could be paid with that contribution. This can explain why many workers don't opt in to the voluntary contribution system, given many barely make ends meet.

The platforms, on the other hand, see themselves as only operating as brokers and providers of labour-matching technology—and thus do not hold themselves to be responsible for the social protection of their workers as traditional employers would. Workers are not protected against arbitrary termination of the work arrangement, as the rule of governance lies unilaterally with the platforms, allowing platforms to make decisions over blocking and deactivate accounts. Under the 1996 Jordanian Labour Law No. (8) and its amendments, employees are protected from immediate dismissals, and immediate termination of the working contract is only legal under extraordinary conditions. Consequently, if platform workers had a regular employee–employer relationship, the common practice of arbitrary termination would be illegal.

Other financial burdens tied to regulatory demands

According to the LTRC, ride-hailing workers can't apply for a license if their vehicle is over seven years old. This forces workers to invest in a new car every seven years (this is a relaxation of the original rule that cars had to be less than five years old, see above). Many workers take out a bank loan to pay for a new car to satisfy this regulatory condition. The purchasing of a new car, however, is accompanied by high sales taxes and customs, further financially burdening the prospective platform worker. This results in the inevitable situation that many workers must pay an estimated monthly debt of up to 600 JOD (USD 848) for 5–6 years.³⁷ Some of the workers we spoke to found themselves in a situation where they had to sell their small businesses to afford a car. The regulatory requirement of a new vehicle every seven years has led to a cycle of debt for many individuals who own vehicles. These workers may lose the flexibility to transition to different sectors and instead become reliant on these platforms until their debts are cleared. To illustrate, individuals who joined ride-hailing platforms back in 2017 and made an investment in a vehicle, now face a decision in 2024: they must either acquire a new vehicle, cease their platform work, or transition to an unlicensed platform. Many of the drivers we interviewed for were unhappy about this regulation,

and told us that they wanted the stipulated operational lifespan of vehicles to be extended to 10 years, allowing them to prioritise debt repayment. Even though the safety of customers should be taken into account, there might be other ways to assess the safety of cars other than age.

Restrictions for non-Jordanian workers

In order to protect the working rights of Jordanian citizens and mitigate the high unemployment rate, access to the labour market is restricted for non-Jordanians,³⁸ with expatriate workers allowed to work only in certain professions.³⁹ Drivers are not included in the list of open sectors. All the workers we interviewed are Jordanians with Jordanian citizenship. There is a possibility that non-Jordanians might work on unlicensed platforms if they don't require drivers to produce a Jordanian passport during the registration process. However, the data collected does not allow us to draw this conclusion.

A note on Jordan's minimum wage

The current minimum wage in Jordan is 260 JOD (US\$ 367) per month, up from 220 JOD (US\$ 310) in January 2021.⁴⁰ While independent research undertaken in 2022 by the Economic Research Forum estimated the living wage is 502 JOD per month,⁴¹ governmental statistics put the pre-pandemic living wage at 480 JOD per month. In comparison, the median wage of informal workers is 330 JOD per month.⁴² The majority (90 percent) of formal workers earn the minimum wage, but only 10 percent earn a living wage of 502 JOD.⁴³ Among formal workers in Jordan, 55.4 percent earn less than 500 JOD (700 USD) per month.⁴⁴

Fairwork Jordan Scores 2023

Minimum standards
of fair work

Careem	0/10	<input type="radio"/> <input type="radio"/> <input type="radio"/> <input type="radio"/> <input type="radio"/> <input type="radio"/> <input type="radio"/> <input type="radio"/> <input type="radio"/> <input type="radio"/> <input type="radio"/>
Careem Box	0/10	<input type="radio"/> <input type="radio"/> <input type="radio"/> <input type="radio"/> <input type="radio"/> <input type="radio"/> <input type="radio"/> <input type="radio"/> <input type="radio"/> <input type="radio"/> <input type="radio"/>
Jeeny	0/10	<input type="radio"/> <input type="radio"/> <input type="radio"/> <input type="radio"/> <input type="radio"/> <input type="radio"/> <input type="radio"/> <input type="radio"/> <input type="radio"/> <input type="radio"/> <input type="radio"/>
Queen Car	0/10	<input type="radio"/> <input type="radio"/> <input type="radio"/> <input type="radio"/> <input type="radio"/> <input type="radio"/> <input type="radio"/> <input type="radio"/> <input type="radio"/> <input type="radio"/> <input type="radio"/>
Talabat	0/10	<input type="radio"/> <input type="radio"/> <input type="radio"/> <input type="radio"/> <input type="radio"/> <input type="radio"/> <input type="radio"/> <input type="radio"/> <input type="radio"/> <input type="radio"/> <input type="radio"/>
Taxi-F	0/10	<input type="radio"/> <input type="radio"/> <input type="radio"/> <input type="radio"/> <input type="radio"/> <input type="radio"/> <input type="radio"/> <input type="radio"/> <input type="radio"/> <input type="radio"/> <input type="radio"/>
Uber	0/10	<input type="radio"/> <input type="radio"/> <input type="radio"/> <input type="radio"/> <input type="radio"/> <input type="radio"/> <input type="radio"/> <input type="radio"/> <input type="radio"/> <input type="radio"/> <input type="radio"/>
Zad	0/10	<input type="radio"/> <input type="radio"/> <input type="radio"/> <input type="radio"/> <input type="radio"/> <input type="radio"/> <input type="radio"/> <input type="radio"/> <input type="radio"/> <input type="radio"/> <input type="radio"/>

THE BREAKDOWN OF SCORES FOR INDIVIDUAL PLATFORMS IS AVAILABLE AT

WWW.FAIR.WORK/JORDAN

Explaining the scores




Fair Pay

As outlined above, the Jordanian legal full-time minimum wage is 260 JOD per month (at 48 hrs/ week) in traditional employer-employee relationships. While the minimum wage law does not include platform workers, the minimum wage serves as a benchmark to assess whether platform workers generate a decent income. After analysing eight platforms, the report found no evidence that any platform had policies in place to guarantee a minimum wage-level income (260 JOD) to platform workers that consistently worked 48 hours a week in all cases. The only partial exception was Zad—a food delivery platform that, according to worker interviews, aimed to minimum wage to its full-time workers. Zad did not extend this guarantee to its part-time workers. Workers from five platforms told us about problems with their pay, including irregular and untimely payments, resulting in financial stress and increased expense and debt burdens on platform workers. Some workers told us that their earnings were sometimes credited into their ‘balance cards’ without their consent.

Working extended hours was a common practice among the workers we spoke to. Some workers reported working as long as 12 hours a day to earn enough income. One worker said he often worked 15–19 hours a day (waiting time included) to earn enough. Several workers reported higher costs due to the regulation requiring cars to be less than seven years old, which lowered their net earnings if they were repaying a loan for their vehicle.

Only a few workers we interviewed said they earned a minimum wage-level income (260 JOD) after deducting all costs they incurred to work on the platform (car maintenance, licencing, fuel costs etc.). Five workers working for three ride-hailing platforms told us they ‘earned’ negative incomes after meeting operational

expenses. We found no evidence that any of the eight platforms guaranteed and had policies or mechanisms in place that defined and aimed at guaranteeing a living wage for full-time workers.



Fair Conditions

No platform received a point for Fair Conditions. Several platforms offered safety gear to workers during the pandemic. Most platforms provided workers with Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) gear and hand sanitiser, but this support stopped once the severity of the pandemic started to subside. The workers we spoke to reported that they had to pay for PPE and sanitisers at some point, and only a few workers reported receiving financial compensation towards it. Similarly, one worker said he had received winter clothes and helmets as safety equipment. However, these instances remained exceptional and were not a common practice among platforms.

It must be noted that all eight platforms we evaluated offered safety training videos and online training processes. However, based on our interviews with workers, we found that this safety training did not include all workers. Several workers said they had not received or been included in any such training. Where this training took place, there was no evidence of the platform compensating workers for the time spent on it.

Many of the workers we interviewed reported problems relating to their physical and mental health wellbeing. General physical unwellness, such as backache and overall health deterioration, were common among platform workers in Jordan. The workers we spoke to were deeply concerned that they felt unsafe and were constantly in fear because of common verbal abuse and unexpected physical violence from customers. This, according to workers,

increased the mental and financial risks of platform work. Several workers said they were constantly afraid of robbery and kidnapping (the latter they had heard from fellow workers). Workers also talked about their experiences of loneliness and the psychological stress in their lives, and felt that platforms—especially the unlicensed ones— incentivised workers to deliver food and drop passengers in a short amount of time, recklessly.

We found no evidence that platforms compensated workers for income loss due to inability to work. One platform had a policy of incentivising workers with a 5 JOD bonus if they completed seven requests in a period determined by the company (which varied from time to time). Some of the workers we spoke to said that precarity at work led them to respond to these incentives. Some platforms put a ceiling on the number of times workers could decline jobs, with one worker saying he could cancel only two trips a day. That said, one ride-hailing platform required workers to take a mandatory break for six hours after working twelve consecutive hours.



Fair Contracts


There was insufficient evidence for any platform to receive a point for Fair Contracts, meaning clear and transparent terms and conditions and no imposition of unfair contract terms.

Most of the workers we spoke to said platforms shared long, unclear and needlessly complicated documents before they could start working. A few workers in each of the platform we evaluated said they had yet to see or read any Terms and Conditions.

It was a common practice that most workers did not read their contracts, and we found no evidence that platforms made an effort to explain their terms and conditions. In one instance, a driver told us he had to sign a bill of exchange (promissory note) for 500 JOD as a deposit. Hence, he was already in debt and would 'owe' money to the company should the platform decide to act against that debt.

One platform worker told us he had received a third-party consumer marketing call that referred to him as a worker on a specific platform. The worker said he had no idea that he had consented to the platform sharing his contact details with others.

Platforms' Terms and Conditions would benefit from being more explicit and transparent, and should contain accessible explanations about their pricing models, including dynamic pricing and price-surfing.



Fair Management

No platform received a point for Fair Management practices. All eight platforms state on their website that workers could communicate with platforms when necessary. However, while some of the workers we spoke to felt supported most said that platform communication was either inconsistent or non-existent.

Furthermore, workers complained that they found it difficult to contact the platforms' administration when seeking redressal measures. Unlicensed apps particularly had arbitrary deactivation policies that lacked due process for affected workers. Many platform workers had informal WhatsApp groups to exchange their experiences and learn from each other to respond to the platforms' unilateral deactivation process.

Regarding equity in management processes, several of the female platform workers we spoke to experienced some discrimination, including verbal harassment and abuse by the platform and from customers. Some operating platforms had a sentence or two on their websites and in terms and conditions stating that customers and drivers should not to discriminate against anyone based on religion and ethnicity. However, most of the workers we interviewed were unaware of the non-discrimination policy.

The workers we interviewed confirmed that there was no transparency of algorithms used to determine access to work or remuneration, or the type of work and pay

scales available to workers seeking to use any of the eight platforms we evaluated.

It must be also noted that the state, through a statute, legally prohibits non-Jordanian workers from taking up most platform work-related jobs.

at the time, other worker demands to platforms regarding lowering commissions have not been met.⁴⁷ Unfortunately, we found no evidence that any platform recognised the group's efforts. Workers interviewed for the report said those found participating in demonstrations were banned and blocked from platforms.



Fair Representation

We found no evidence that any of the eight platforms we evaluated had a documented mechanism for the expression of collective worker voice that allows all workers, regardless of employment status, to participate without risks. Despite drivers' collective informal activism, such as strikes and road blocking, platform workers in Jordan lacked a formal space to represent their grievances to their platform managers.

Our interviews with workers and desk research showed that their freedom of association largely depended on informal groups on social media platforms such as WhatsApp and Facebook. In one instance, a worker expressed concern that the platform they worked for would monitor worker presence and activism on Facebook and sometimes banned workers based on their comments.

Labour unions in Jordan are restricted to one union per sector, the establishment of which is subject to government approval. A platform-specific union does not exist, which impacts workers' collective activism to represent their interests to their respective platforms. As a result, drivers often informally organise themselves through social media. For example, the "Smart App Captains Union" on Facebook (a social media group) has 27,900 members as of July 2023. The transportation sector saw 45 labour protests last year, with dozens of them organised by ride-hailing drivers to demand better working conditions;⁴⁵ but protests were also organised jointly among all actors in the transportation sector—taxi drivers, platform workers, bus drivers, lorry drivers etc.—after the government announced a spike in fuel prices in November 2022.⁴⁶ While the government eventually gave in to demands to not raise the fuel prices

PLATFORM IN FOCUS

Obstacles in achievement of full flexibility working on platforms

Jeeny

The ride-hailing platform Jeeny launched in 2014 in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) and has operated in Jordan since 2017. Jeeny has its headquarters in Riyadh, KSA, and has other offices in the KSA, Jordan, and Pakistan. In Jordan, Jeeny is a non-premium licensed platform, which means a worker must pay an annual license fee of 420 JOD.

Workers for Jeeny must pay their commission for cash-paid trips upfront. According to the drivers we spoke to, most customers pay for their trips on the platform in cash, which means that drivers pay the commission to the platforms through the balance card system.⁴⁸

The workers we spoke to said that when customers pay through credit cards on Jeeny, the platform tends to credit this income to the worker's balance card as prepaid commission for future cash-paid trips instead of as a direct payment to the worker. This applies unless workers are willing to receive their payments through ZainCash or have a Bank al Etihad account. In addition, workers had to contend with delayed charges (on the part of the customer or the platform), high expenses and low earnings.

All the workers we interviewed expressed concerns regarding their physical and mental health. Workers said they took the initiative to create a WhatsApp group to contact each other in emergencies.

According to Jeeny's policy, workers can decline two trips per day. Should workers continue to decline more than two trips per day, they report being fined by the platform. This added additional stress to the workers, as they needed to choose which trips to accept and felt they were forced to take trips that could be unsafe.

Most of the workers we spoke to were issued online contracts or Terms and Conditions. One worker said he was provided only with a verbal agreement, while another stated that he commenced work without any formal contract. Meanwhile, those who did receive a contract admitted to not reading them, primarily due to their excessive length. None of the workers reported to have received a physical copy of the contract.

The workers we spoke to were generally unaware of Jeeny's policy regarding its workers' data protection. One worker suspected that his data was shared with a third party without consent because he received scam calls from dubious companies asking for personal information, or trying to recruit him for competing ride-hailing platforms.

Workers reported that they had to complete 1,500 trips per year with Jeeny to renew their permit for the next year, leading to additional pressure on workers. Moreover, workers said that some platform changes appeared suddenly; for example, Jeeny changed its commission fee from 10 percent before the COVID-19 pandemic to 15 percent after the COVID-19 pandemic, without any proper consultation or notification.

Workers were aware of Jeeny's help centre but felt it could be more supportive of workers. For example, workers said there was no way to contact the administration directly. This lack of direct communication became an issue when the platform management deactivated workers without warning, and when workers needed to seek clarification about things from managers.

Several of the workers we interviewed said they participated in a strike or public protest of the fuel price hikes. Participating in strikes is a risk for the drivers, as some workers who participated in strikes have since been blocked from the application. Workers also said that the platform management closely monitored the workers' Facebook group—an informal space for workers. Recognising a workers' collective could help Jeeny and its workers improve their income and working conditions.



Workers' Stories

Being a woman working on a platform

Zahra is a woman delivery worker. She finds that the morning shift is safer, but the evening shifts from 6 to 12 pm are more lucrative. In addition, specific neighbourhoods, usually in West-Amman, are safer and easier to work in as restaurants are generally close to the customers' houses. However, there is no option for workers to choose which order to deliver. She told us she had to deliver orders in the late evening to neighbourhoods that are far away, where she felt unsafe: "I went to an area with only trees around, and there was no internet connection. There were no houses or streetlights, and I walked alone, trying to find the door. Ultimately, I did not arrive at the customer's house and couldn't deliver the order. The situation was tough. I went back to the same road. Who could have come to save me if anything had happened to me? I mean, it happened many times that I got asked to deliver to places like that, and I was afraid." Workers on her platform do not see the exact area where they will deliver from the start and are disincentivised from cancelling orders, as they can usually only cancel one or two orders, as it would otherwise block them for a week.

In another instance, Zahra delivered an order to the apartment door of a customer who opened the door in his underwear. This conduct left her feeling uneasy and unsafe, prompting her to reflect on the concerns within her work: "Sometimes I see a guy opening the door in his underwear, but I have to continue my work even though I don't feel safe." She requested from the platform that workers shouldn't have to deliver directly to customers' apartments, but also acknowledges that she can do nothing to pressure the platform into better protecting its female workers.

The vicious cycle of platform-induced indebtedness hinders workers to demand their rights

Nasser⁴⁹ has worked on a ride-hailing platform for five years. He started working for platforms to support himself through university and took out a loan to pay for a suitable car that would meet regulatory requirements. While

Nasser would like to participate in strikes, he fears being blocked from working on the platform. Due to his financial obligations, including loans and borrowings, he needs his job. Nasser told us that if he declines more than one order during his working day, his acceptance rate of orders declines, and he doesn't receive any new orders for the next six hours. Nasser is unable to do anything about this and feels unheard by the platform. There are sometimes good reasons for not accepting an order. However, he is afraid that if he speaks up, he will be banned from the platform and will lose income.

Halting of life plans

Seif has worked since 2015 with one ride-hailing platform and since 2021 with another. Before that, he was unemployed. The lower commission at his new platform made it attractive for him, and he also gets to see the trip's destination, a functionality unavailable on his earlier platform. He starts his work day by logging into the app around 8:00 or 9:00 am and finishes working around 10:00 or 11:00 pm. So far, he has always achieved a high rating. Seif actually wants to stop working as a ride-hailing worker, as the work tires him, but he has to pay 500 JOD a month to pay off his car loan and therefore has to continue working. Unfortunately, his work interferes with his life plans. He can't get married, as he doesn't earn enough and he works too many hours. He also finds dealing with customers tiring, and the licencing procedures, high fuel costs, permits, and car maintenance prices make the sector unattractive to him. He told us, "I haven't maintained my car for a long time, and I'm still paying the loan. The car has become junk due to the lack of maintenance and the high cost of maintenance equipment." Seif has participated in multiple strikes, and he would like to see a change in the management style and lower commissions. Essentially, he would like the platform to be more responsive to driver demands and help drivers with their problems.

***Fairwork has anonymised names to protect workers' privacy.**

Themes in Focus

Freelancing, yet not free

While platform workers are often misclassified as independent contractors or freelancers, they are neither free nor independent. Indeed, workers bear the full risk of entrepreneurs and are financially responsible for their work, but lack control over their service, for example, not knowing trip destinations (for some platforms), and penalties for declining gigs. Workers must also contend with major expenses such as taxes or fees. Licensed ride-hailing workers, particularly, are subject to triple taxation, for their permit at the LTRC, the sales tax, and car ownership license. The law classifies platform workers as freelancers, so they are not allowed to form unions and can only voluntarily contribute to the social security, meaning high contribution rates. Many of the workers we spoke to said that they wanted to stop working as platform workers, but loans and debt tie them to continue working for the platforms. Workers we spoke to also proposed that the platform should pay for their permits, and agreed that commissions should be reduced for workers to earn wages that cover more than just their basic needs. In addition, some workers indicated that platforms should be responsible for paying the “employer share” of the social security contribution.

Women and platform work

While the growth of the platform economy is opening new jobs, the question remains how suitable it is in alleviating the high unemployment rates of women in Jordan. Female drivers were scarce and hard to find for interviews, with the two female ride-hailing drivers we found either needing to stop working or refusing to be interviewed. In the food delivery sector, female workers demanded additional safety measures with many of our interviewees saying that they do not want to go inside customers’ buildings but prefer delivering to the public entrance only. Other women told us they felt they had to sacrifice their safety in order to earn an income. This indicates that more needs to be done to ensure women can do their work safely. However, no platform put special safeguarding measures in place to protect (female) workers. A number of measures should be taken to ensure women are safe at work. First, by paying all workers fair wages, workers should be given

more freedom to decide their work and choose which jobs to accept and which to decline. Second, transparency of jobs allows women to make fully informed decisions about their work; women can either decline trips if they feel unsafe or take additional measures when taking on a gig. Third, clear procedures on how workers can receive help in emergencies, such as SOS buttons, can partly alleviate the fear that women experience during their working hours. Lastly, platform companies should provide accessible reporting or complaint mechanisms. This should be done in cooperation between the platforms and authorities so that workers know their complaints will be followed up. This also sends a clear signal to women that their complaints are indeed taken seriously.

Mental Health

A worrying number of workers we interviewed reported physical and mental health concerns—involving all workers, across all platforms. The concerns raised by workers range from safety issues such as the chance of traffic accidents, being robbed or mugged, being assaulted, verbally harassed or abused, lewd comments, and gendered concerns, to loneliness and stress. Prolonged working hours, being stuck in traffic jams, and sitting behind the wheel not only cause loneliness and distress for many workers but also jeopardises road safety as it negatively affects concentration and focus on the streets. This is further exacerbated by the balance card system on some platforms that creates a debt relationship where the worker must pay before generating an income, which forces workers to stay on shifts for longer hours. Platforms clearly need to consider the occupational health of their workers. This could be done by paying a fair wage and adopting a business model where reckless driving is no longer incentivised, that is, where workers don’t try to work as many gigs in as little time as possible to make ends meet—thereby jeopardising road and personal safety. Investing in paid safety training and equipment operation and improving awareness on wellbeing process to mitigate stress can protect workers from task-specific risks. Given the balance card system traps workers in debt, removing prepaid commission system could give back workers some freedom and flexibility over their work.

Moving forward

The previous sections have highlighted that drivers working on delivery and ride-hailing apps in Jordan face distinctive precarious working conditions. Regulation of the market that favours platforms over workers is one factor that drives this. Moreover, in ride-hailing, licensing regulations favour specific platforms.

While the platform economy offers work opportunities for those groups most stricken by Jordan's high unemployment rates—youth and women—the competent regulatory authorities in Jordan should ensure that the creation of new jobs aligns with international standards of decent work and social protection. While it is understandable that legislators might be hesitant to over-regulate the sector for fear of hampering economic growth, this growth should not come at the expense of the standards that are enshrined in several ILO conventions ratified by Jordan, and other national policies such as the Economic Modernisation Vision and the National Social Protection Strategy. However, the responsibility to ensure decent working conditions for platform workers is not just the responsibility of governing bodies alone. Platforms are also responsible for ensuring that their workers work under decent working conditions. In other countries, platforms have had to adapt their practices to meet regulatory requirements and continue to operate in these countries. Platforms should be responsible for implementing worker protection policies in all their countries of operation equally—instead of taking advantage of regulatory vacuums like Jordan, where regulation has not kept pace with the fast growth of the platform economy.

As part of this research, a round table discussion was held with representatives from the Ministry of Transportation, the Ministry of Digital Economy and Entrepreneurship, one representative from GIZ Jordan, the Land Transport Regulatory Authority, the Syndicate of Jordanian drivers, the voluntary steering committee for platforms drivers, and the Federation of Jordanian Independent Trade Unions. Unfortunately, despite being invited to the discussion, none

of the eight platforms we rated in this report attended the meeting.

That said, the Fairwork Jordan research team shared the provisional scoring and justifications to all platforms before the publication and launch of this report. As a result, some platforms have understood the potential for communication on improving working conditions and have indicated their willingness to cooperate. This represents a first step to engaging workers, platform representatives and decision-makers with each other to discuss critical questions on platform workers' rights. Phenix Center and Fairwork will continue to support platforms on these matters in the future.

Recommendations

Finally, the results of this study lead us to the following recommendations.

- Regulations regarding the platform economy need to be revised and strengthened. This could include adding a dedicated definition of platform workers in the Jordanian Labour Law, combined with a definition of platform workers' rights and the definition of the employee–employer relationship in the sector. It has become clear that current regulations on freelance workers are insufficient to protect workers in the sector.
- By incorporating platform work as a work category under the Labour Law, platform workers would be protected by Labour Law, with the Ministry of Labour conducting inspections and ensuring adherence to the

law. This would include provisions on health and safety at work that have recently been strengthened for all formal employees in Jordan.

- Revised regulations should also revisit the taxes and fees levied on workers as they carry out their work. Currently, the brunt of the tax burden is put on workers. Platforms pay for their operating licenses in Jordan, but sales tax is deducted from workers' income, in addition to the licensing fees due by all ride-hailing workers.
- Platform workers must be included in social security, formalising their working relationship. We recommend that either platforms be obliged to pay the employer share of social security subscriptions, or that a reduced tariff for platform workers' voluntary contribution to the Social Security Cooperation is introduced.
- Platforms should revise their policies regarding the health and safety of workers, their algorithms for assigning gigs and their policies on deactivating workers. Fairwork can offer support in aligning these policies with international standards.

- All platform policies that contradict the five Fairwork principles or place unnecessary burdens on workers, such as the balance card system, should be replaced by just and fair policies.
- In particular, in the Jordanian context, which poses cultural challenges and actual threats to female workers, platforms should develop dedicated non-discrimination policies on inclusion of women and ensuring their safety at work.
- For workers to engage with platforms to improve their working conditions, they need mechanisms to engage with platform managers. This includes efficient means of communication with the platform beyond help centres, and steps taken to consider the establishment of a trade union for platform workers. This would mean the inclusion of platform workers in the tripartite social dialogue.
- Platforms should revise their contracts and terms and conditions to be accessible and understandable for all workers. This should include providing a contract in Arabic in all instances.



Pathways of Change


Fairwork’s theory of change relies on a humanist belief in the power of empathy and knowledge. If they have the economic means to choose, many consumers will be discerning about the platform services they use. Our yearly ratings give consumers the ability to choose the highest scoring platform operating in a sector, thus contributing to pressure on platforms to improve their working conditions and their scores. In this way, we leverage consumer solidarity with workers’ allies in the fight for fairer working conditions. Beyond individual consumer choices, our scores can help inform the procurement, investment and partnership policies of large organisations. They can serve as a reference for institutions and companies who want to ensure they are supporting fair labour practices.

This is the first round of Fairwork ratings for Jordan. We focused on five ride-hailing platforms, and three (food) delivery platforms. We recorded null (0/10) scores for all of the platforms due to insufficient evidence of compliance with ethical labour practices based on the five Fairwork principles, namely: Fair Pay, Fair Conditions, Fair Contracts, Fair Management and Fair Representation. We continue to call on the platforms and other stakeholders to commit to advancing and promoting fairness in the platform ecosystem. As Fairwork’s reach and visibility increase, we see some avenues for contributing to the continued improvement of the Jordanian platform economy. In this regard, we see the following pathways to change (Figure 2).

Our first and most direct pathway to improving working conditions in digital labour platforms is by engaging directly with platforms operating in Jordan. Though platforms are aware of our research, platforms have not provided evidence from their side as part of our scoring process. However, two platforms have now indicated

that they are inclined to engage with Fairwork in the future. This represents a great first step towards improving working conditions in the platform sector.

Figure 2: Fairwork’s Pathways to Change




We have engaged with policy makers and regulators facilitating discussions on expanding social security to all workers, including platform workers in Jordan over the past year. We have further documented platform workers' protests during 2022.

Finally, and most importantly, workers and their organisations are at the core of Fairwork's model. Firstly, the Fairwork principles have been developed and are continually refined in close consultation with workers and their representatives (Figure 3).

There is nothing inevitable about poor working conditions in the platform economy. Despite their claims to the contrary, platforms have substantial control over the nature of the jobs that they mediate. Workers who find their jobs through platforms are ultimately still workers, and there is no

basis for denying them the key rights and protections that their counterparts in the formal sector have long enjoyed. Our scores show that the platform economy, as we know it today, already takes many forms, with some platforms displaying greater concern for workers' needs than others. This means that we do not need to accept low pay, poor conditions, inequity, and a lack of agency and voice as the norm. We hope that our work—by highlighting the contours of today's platform economy—paints a picture of what it could become.

Figure 3: Fairwork Principles: Continuous Worker-guided Evolution



The Fairwork Pledge

As part of this process of change, we have introduced the Fairwork pledge. This pledge leverages the power of organisations' procurement, investment, and partnership policies to support fairer platform work. Organisations like universities, schools, businesses, and charities who make use of platform labour can make a difference by supporting the best labour practices, guided by our five principles of fair work. Organisations who sign the pledge get to display our badge on company materials.

The pledge constitutes two levels. This first is as an official Fairwork Supporter, which entails publicly demonstrating support for fairer platform work, and making resources available to staff and members to help them in deciding which platforms to engage with. A second level of the pledge entails organisations committing to concrete and meaningful changes in their own practices as official Fairwork Partners.

MORE INFORMATION ABOUT THE PLEDGE, AND HOW TO SIGN UP, IS AVAILABLE AT

FAIR.WORK/PLEDGE



APPENDIX

Fairwork Scoring System

Which companies are covered by the Fairwork principles?

The International Labour Organisation (ILO) defines a “digital labour platform” as an enterprise that mediates and facilitates “labour exchange between different users, such as businesses, workers and consumers”.⁵⁰ That includes digital labour “marketplaces” where “businesses set up the tasks and requirements and the platforms match these to a global pool of workers who can complete the tasks within the specified time”.⁵¹ Marketplaces that do not facilitate labour exchanges—for example, Airbnb (which matches owners of accommodation with those seeking to rent short term accommodation) and eBay (which matches buyers and sellers of goods)—are obviously excluded from the definition. The ILO’s definition of “digital labour platform” is widely accepted and includes many different business models.⁵²

Fairwork’s research covers digital labour platforms that fall within this definition that aim to connect individual service providers with consumers of the service through the platform interface. Fairwork’s research does not cover platforms that mediate offers of employment between individuals and employers (whether on a long-term or on a temporary basis).

Fairwork distinguishes between two types of these platforms. The first, is “geographically-tethered” platforms where the work is required to be done in a particular location such as delivering food from a restaurant to an apartment, driving a person from one part of town to another or cleaning. These are often referred to as “gig work platforms”. The second is “cloudwork” platforms where the work can, in theory, be performed from any location via the internet.

The thresholds for meeting each principle are different for location-based and cloudwork platforms because location-based work platforms can be benchmarked against local market factors, risks/harms, and regulations that apply in that country, whereas cloudwork platforms cannot because (by their nature) the work can be performed from anywhere and so different market factors, risks/harms, and regulations apply depending on where the work is performed.

The platforms covered by Fairwork’s research have different business, revenue and governance models including employment-based, subcontractor, commission-based, franchise, piece-rate, shift-based, and subscription models. Some of those models involve the platforms making direct payments to workers (including through sub-contractors).

How does the scoring system work?

The five Principles of Fairwork were developed through an extensive literature review of published research on job quality, stakeholder meetings at UNCTAD and the ILO in Geneva (involving platform operators, policymakers, trade unions, and academics), and in-country meetings with local stakeholders.

Each Fairwork Principle is divided into two thresholds. Accordingly, for each Principle, the scoring system allows the first to be awarded corresponding to the first threshold, and an additional second point to be awarded corresponding to the second threshold (see Table 1).

The second point under each Principle can only be awarded if the first point for that Principle has been awarded. The thresholds specify the evidence required for a platform to receive a given point. Where no verifiable evidence is available that meets a given threshold, the platform is not awarded that point.

A platform can therefore receive a maximum Fairwork score of ten points. Fairwork scores are updated on a yearly basis; the scores presented in this report were derived from data pertaining to the 12 months between October 2022 and August 2023, and are valid until August 2024.

Table 1 Fairwork: Scoring System

Principle	First point	Second point	Total
 Principle 1: Fair Pay	 Ensures workers earn at least the local minimum wage after costs	 Ensures workers earn at least a local living wage after costs	 2
 Principle 2: Fair Conditions	 Mitigates task-specific risks	 Provides a safety net	 2
 Principle 3: Fair Contracts	 Provides clear and transparent terms and conditions	 Ensures that no unfair contract terms are imposed	 2
 Principle 4: Fair Management	 Provides due process for decisions affecting workers	 Provides equity in the management process	 2
 Principle 5: Fair Representation	 Assures freedom of association and the expression of collective worker voice	 Supports democratic governance	 2

Maximum possible Fairwork Score



Principle 1: Fair Pay

1.1 – Ensures workers earn at least the local minimum wage after costs (one point)

Platform workers often have substantial work-related costs to cover, such as transport between jobs, supplies, or fuel, insurance, and maintenance on a vehicle.⁵³ Workers' costs sometimes mean their take-home earnings may fall below the local minimum wage.⁵⁴ Workers also absorb the costs of extra time commitment, when they spend time waiting or travelling between jobs, or other unpaid activities necessary for their work, such as mandatory training, which are also considered active hours.⁵⁵ To achieve this point platforms must ensure that work-related costs do not push workers below local minimum wage.

The platform takes appropriate steps to ensure both of the following:

- Payment must be on time and in-full.
- Workers earn at least the local minimum wage, or the wage set by collective sectoral agreement (whichever is higher) in the place where they work, in their active hours, after costs.⁵⁶

1.2 – Ensures workers earn at least a local living wage after costs (one additional point)

In some places, the minimum wage is not enough to allow workers to afford a basic but decent standard of living. To achieve this point platforms must ensure that work-related costs do not push workers below local living wage.

The platform takes appropriate steps to ensure the following:

- Workers earn at least a local living wage, or the wage set by collective sectoral agreement (whichever is higher) in the place where they work, in their active hours, after costs.^{57,58}

Principle 2: Fair Conditions

2.1 – Mitigates task-specific risks (one point)

Platform workers may encounter a number of risks in the course of their work, including accidents and injuries, harmful materials, and crime and violence. To achieve this point platforms must show that they are aware of these risks and take basic steps to mitigate them.

The platform must satisfy the following:

- Adequate equipment and training is provided to protect workers' health and safety from task-specific risks.⁵⁹ These should be implemented at no additional cost to the worker.
- The platform mitigates the risks of lone working by providing adequate support and designing processes with occupational safety and health in mind.

2.2 – Ensures safe working conditions and a safety net (one additional point)

Platform workers are vulnerable to the possibility of abruptly losing their income as the result of unexpected or external circumstances, such as sickness or injury. Most countries provide a social safety net to ensure workers don't experience sudden poverty due to circumstances outside their control. However, platform workers usually don't qualify for protections such as sick pay, because of their independent contractor status. In recognition of the fact that most workers are dependent on income they earn from platform work, platforms should ensure that workers are compensated for loss of income due to inability to work. In addition, platforms must minimise the risk of sickness and injury even when all the basic steps have been taken.

The platform must satisfy ALL of the following:

- Platforms take meaningful steps to ensure that workers do not suffer significant costs as a result of accident, injury or disease resulting from work.
- Workers should be compensated for income loss due to inability to work commensurate with the worker's average earnings over the past three months.
- Where workers are unable to work for an extended period due to unexpected circumstances, their standing on the platform is not negatively impacted.
- The platform implements policies or practices that protect workers' safety from task-specific risks.⁶⁰ In particular, the platform should ensure that pay is not structured in a way that incentivizes workers to take excessive levels of risk.

Principle 3: Fair Contracts

3.1 – Provides clear and transparent terms and conditions (one point)

The terms and conditions governing platform work are not always clear and accessible to workers.⁶¹ To achieve this point, the platform must demonstrate that workers are able

to understand, agree to, and access the conditions of their work at all times, and that they have legal recourse if the other party breaches those conditions.

The platform must satisfy ALL of the following:

- The party contracting with the worker must be identified in the contract, and subject to the law of the place in which the worker works.
- The contract/terms & conditions are presented in full in clear and comprehensible language that all workers could be expected to understand.
- Workers have to sign a contract and/or give informed consent to terms of conditions upon signing up for the platform.
- The contracts/terms and conditions are easily accessible to workers in paper form, or via the app/platform interface at all times.
- Contracts/terms & conditions do not include clauses that revert prevailing legal frameworks in the respective countries.
- Platforms take adequate, responsible and ethical data protection and management measures, laid out in a documented policy.

3.2 – Ensures that no unfair contract terms are imposed (one additional point)

In some cases, especially under “independent contractor” classifications, workers carry a disproportionate amount of risk for engaging in a contract with the service user. They may be liable for any damage arising in the course of their work, and they may be prevented by unfair clauses from seeking legal redress for grievances. To achieve this point, platforms must demonstrate that risks and liability of engaging in the work is shared between parties.

Regardless of how the contractual status of the worker is classified, the platform must satisfy ALL of the following:

- Every worker is notified of proposed changes in clear and understandable language within a reasonable timeframe before changes come into effect; and the changes should not reverse existing accrued benefits and reasonable expectations on which workers have relied.
- The contract/terms and conditions neither include clauses which exclude liability for negligence nor

unreasonably exempt the platform from liability for working conditions. The platform takes appropriate steps to ensure that the contract does not include clauses which prevent workers from effectively seeking redress for grievances which arise from the working relationship.

- In case platform labour is mediated by subcontractors: The platform implements a reliable mechanism to monitor and ensure that the subcontractor is living up to the standards expected from the platform itself regarding working conditions.
- In cases where there is dynamic pricing used for services, the data collected and calculations used to allocate payment must be transparent and documented in a form available to workers.

Principle 4: Fair Management

4.1 – Provides due process for decisions affecting workers (one point)

Platform workers can experience arbitrary deactivation; being barred from accessing the platform without explanation, and potentially losing their income. Workers may be subject to other penalties or disciplinary decisions without the ability to contact the service user or the platform to challenge or appeal them if they believe they are unfair. To achieve this point, platforms must demonstrate an avenue for workers to meaningfully appeal disciplinary actions.

The platform must satisfy ALL of the following:

- There is an easily accessible channel for workers to communicate with a human representative of the platform and to effectively solve problems. This channel is documented in the contract and available on the platform interface. Platforms should respond to workers within a reasonable timeframe. There is a process for workers to meaningfully and effectively appeal low ratings, non-payment, payment issues, deactivations, and other penalties and disciplinary actions. This process is documented in a contract and available on the platform interface.⁶²
- In the case of deactivations, the appeals process must be available to workers who no longer have access to the platform.
- Workers are not disadvantaged for voicing concerns or appealing disciplinary actions.

4.2 – Provides equity in the management process (one additional point)

The majority of platforms do not actively discriminate against particular groups of workers. However, they may inadvertently exacerbate already existing inequalities in their design and management. For example, there is a lot of gender segregation between different types of platform work. To achieve this point, platforms must show not only that they have policies against discrimination, but also that they seek to remove barriers for disadvantaged groups, and promote inclusion.

Platforms must satisfy ALL of the following:

- The platform has an effective anti-discrimination policy laying out a clear process for reporting, correcting and penalising discrimination of workers on the platform on grounds such as race, social origin, caste, ethnicity, nationality, gender, sex, gender identity and expression, sexual orientation, disability, religion or belief, age or any other status.⁶³
- The platform has measures in place to promote diversity, equality and inclusion on the platform. It takes practical measures to promote equality of opportunity for workers from disadvantaged groups, including reasonable accommodation for pregnancy, disability, and religion or belief.
- Where persons from a disadvantaged group (such as women) are significantly under-represented among a pool of workers, it seeks to identify and remove barriers to access by persons from that group.
- If algorithms are used to determine access to work or remuneration or the type of work and pay scales available to workers seeking to use the platform, these are transparent and do not result in inequitable outcomes for workers from historically or currently disadvantaged groups.
- It has mechanisms to reduce the risk of users discriminating against workers from disadvantaged groups in accessing and carrying out work.

Principle 5: Fair Representation

5.1 – Assures freedom of association and the expression of worker voice (one point)

Freedom of association is a fundamental right for all workers, and enshrined in the constitution of the

International Labour Organisation, and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The right for workers to organise, collectively express their wishes—and importantly—be listened to, is an important prerequisite for fair working conditions. However, rates of organisation amongst platform workers remain low. To achieve this point, platforms must ensure that the conditions are in place to encourage the expression of collective worker voice.

Platforms must satisfy ALL of the following:

- There is a documented mechanism⁶⁴ for the expression of collective worker voice that allows ALL workers, regardless of employment status, to participate without risks.
- There is a formal, written statement of willingness to recognise, and bargain with, a collective, independent body of workers or trade union, that is clearly communicated to all workers, and available on the platform interface.⁶⁵
- Freedom of association is not inhibited, and workers are not disadvantaged in any way for communicating their concerns, wishes and demands to the platform, or expressing willingness to form independent collective bodies of representation.⁶⁶

5.2 – Supports democratic governance (one additional point)

While rates of organisation remain low, platform workers' associations are emerging in many sectors and countries. We are also seeing a growing number of cooperative worker-owned platforms. To realise fair representation, workers must have a say in the conditions of their work. This could be through a democratically governed cooperative model, a formally recognised union, or the ability to undertake collective bargaining with the platform.

The platform must satisfy at least ONE of the following:

1. Workers play a meaningful role in governing it.
2. In a written document available at all times on the platform interface, the platform publicly and formally recognises an independent collective body of workers, an elected works council, or trade union. This recognition is not exclusive and, when the legal framework allows, the platform should recognise any significant collective body seeking representation.⁶⁷

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53 Work-related costs include direct costs the worker may incur in performing the job. This may include, for instance, transport in between jobs, supplies, vehicle repair and maintenance, fuel, road tolls and vehicle insurance. However, it does not include transport to and from the job (unless in-between tasks) nor taxes, social security contributions or health insurance.

54 The ILO defines minimum wage as the “minimum amount of remuneration that an employer is required to pay wage earners for the work performed during a given period, which cannot be reduced by collective agreement or an individual contract”. Minimum wage laws protect workers from unduly low pay and help them attain a minimum standard of living. The ILO’s Minimum Wage Fixing Convention, 1970 C135 sets the conditions and requirements of establishing minimum wages and calls upon all ratifying countries to act in accordance. Minimum wage laws exist in more than 90 per cent of the ILO member states.

55 Work-related costs include direct costs the worker may incur in performing the job. This may include, for instance, transport in between jobs, supplies, vehicle repair and maintenance, fuel, road tolls and vehicle insurance. However, it does not include transport to and from the job (unless in-between tasks) nor taxes, social security contributions or health insurance.

56 In addition to direct working hours where workers are completing tasks, workers also spend time performing unpaid activities necessary for their work, such as waiting for delivery orders at restaurants and travelling between jobs and undertaking mandatory training (i.e., training activities that must be completed for workers to continue accessing work on the platform). These indirect working hours are also considered part of active hours as workers are giving this time to the platform. Thus, ‘active hours’ are defined as including both direct and indirect working hours.

57 Where a living wage does not exist, Fairwork will use the Global Living Wage Coalition’s Anker Methodology to estimate one.

58 In order to evidence this, where the platform is responsible for paying workers the platform must either: (a) have a documented policy that ensures the workers receive at least the local minimum wage after costs in their active hours; or (b) provide summary statistics of transaction and cost.

59 In order to evidence this, where the platform is responsible for paying workers the platform must either: (a) have a documented policy that ensures the workers receive at least the local living wage after costs in their active hours; or (b) provide summary statistics of transaction and cost data evidencing all workers earn a minimum wage after costs.

60 The ILO recognises health and safety at work as a fundamental right. Where the platform directly engages the worker, the starting point is the ILO’s Occupational Safety and Health Convention, 1981 (C155). This stipulates that employers shall be required “so far as is reasonably practicable, the workplaces, machinery, equipment and processes under their control are safe and without risk to health”, and that “where necessary, adequate protective clothing and protective equipment [should be provided] to prevent, so far as is reasonably practicable, risk of accidents or of adverse effects on health”.

61 Workers should have the option of escalating grievances that have not been satisfactorily addressed and, in the case of automated decisions, should have the option of escalating it for human mediation.

62 The ILO’s Maritime Labour Convention, 2006 (MLC 2006), Reg. 2.1, and the Domestic Workers Convention, 2011 (C189), Articles 7 and 15, serve as helpful guiding examples of adequate provisions in workers’ terms and conditions, as well as worker access to those terms and conditions.

63 In accordance with the ILO Convention No. 111 concerning Discrimination in Respect of Employment and Occupation and applicable national law.

64 A mechanism for the expression of collective worker voice will allow workers to participate in the setting of agendas so as to be able to table issues that most concern them. This mechanism can be in physical or virtual form (e.g. online meetings) and should involve meaningful interaction (e.g. not surveys). It should also allow for ALL workers to participate in regular meetings with the management.

65 For example, “[the platform] will support any effort by its workers to collectively organise or form a trade union. Collective bargaining through trade unions can often bring about more favourable working conditions”.

66 See the ILO’s Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise Convention, 1948 (C087), which stipulates that “workers and employers, without distinction, shall have the right to establish and join organisations of their own choosing without previous authorisation” (Article 2); “the public authorities shall refrain from any interference which would restrict the right or impede the lawful exercise thereof” (Article 3) and that “workers’ and employers’ organisations shall not be dissolved or suspended by administrative authority” (Article 4). Similarly the ILO’s Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention, 1949 (C098) protects the workers against acts of anti-union discrimination in respect of their employment, explaining that not joining a union or relinquishing trade union membership cannot be made a condition of employment or cause for

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


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